Survival strategies of non-state armed groups (NSAGs): A comparative analysis of Ha'yat Tahrir Al-Sham, Boko Haram and Al-Shabab

The audacious rise of Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs)'s indefatigable and spatiotemporal policies has presented policymakers with diachronically interlinked and often unprecedented challenges. From territorial control that weakens state sovereignty to establishing governance structures that create new legitimacy opportunities, armed groups are now generating more challenges as they live longer. This dissertation addresses an identified gap in the field of armed groups' survival-length. This study delves into the reasons why some armed groups live longer while some others can survive just for a few years. In tackling this question, drawing on a new research framework, the theoretical intention is to create an overarching insight into the dynamics related to determining their survival logic. This framework covers the territorial, political, organizational, and operational components that conflate them on their set of strategies to live longer. In contrast to the findings of other studies, the survival of the strategically sophisticated, multidimensional, and armament-based groups cannot be explained by individual factors. Instead, their survival logic depends on interconnected factors analyzed through aforementioned components. Moreover, this study also creates a new comprehensive framework/perspective to analyze armed groups' management, organization, and operational logic using their survival strategies