'the rational', 'The acceptable' and 'The ambivalent' in translation: Translation ethics, professional codes and individual morality

The idea that translation ethics should be regarded as professional ethics and that oaths, professional codes, standards and laws should be more comprehensive is shared by many in and outside the field of translation. The major aim of this dissertation is to question whether professional codes suffice to make translators moral individuals. Chapter 2 presents an overview of major translation theories with their propositions, basic terminology and contributions to the field aiming to explore their underlying implications and to problematize how normative tendencies and universalist ideals are transferred to the present day through the concepts of 'the rational' and 'the acceptable'. The chapter also looks at the issue of translator's morality using Zygmunt Bauman's idea of 'ambivalence' in individual moral decisions and evaluates the positions these theories take in translation ethics. Chapter 3 seeks to scrutinize the present day situation in translation ethics lately referred to as professional ethics. Following an inquiry into the possible reasons behind the globally increasing interest in professional ethics and in translation ethics in particular, the chapter proceeds to examine the existing oaths, professional codes and laws that reflect universalist ideals and to draw attention to some (potential) moral problems, conflicts and dilemmas in certain sub-fields of translation despite the existence of such codes. Drawing on İoanna Kuçuradi's interpretation of value ethics and starting from the question of whether the existing or possible moral problems in translation actually differ from those encountered in other professions, the chapter also discusses the functions of professional codes. Finally, in the light of Bauman's view of postmodern ethics and his ideas on 'the ambivalence' of morality, the chapter seeks to reveal how moral decisions are determined by professional ethics and codes leaving limited space for individual decisions and even taking the individual out of the moral equation. This dissertation proposes that it might be more meaningful, beneficial and, above all, democratic to adopt a view of ethics emphasizing the individuality of moral choices than to insist on formulating deontic codes in the hope that they may be universally accepted.