Martin Heidegger'in düşüncesinde özgürlük

The reformulation of the question of Being in the question of the freedom seems to constitute a decisive step in the heideggerian investigations to radicalize traditional ontology and theology. In this thesis, we tried to highlight the reason for which Heidegger initiates an investigation of large scale on the question of the freedom after the publication of Being and Time. We intended also to discuss the difficulties rising of the interpretations of Heidegger. We tried to formulate and elaborate progressively two theses in the spot of objections that Heidegger addresses to the Critique of Kant and to the schellingian theology of the freedom. Our first thesis is that the heideggerian radicalization of Kantian freedom conception developed in the framework of a metaphysics of Dasein, does not allow to the discovery of a philosophical context from where a more original problematic of freedom could be formulated and the heideggerian questioning is nothing but a repetition of it and a remarkable application example for elaborating a question, non Kantian to namely the question of meaning of Being. Our second thesis is that from the thesis of ontological difference and the cost of forgetting the schellingian concept of absolute, heideggerian questioning could only develop a secularized variant of theological dialectics of Schelling. The being (Sein) melted in the freedom, in the foundation ground, in abyss manifests itself through what it renders itself possible, that is to say through being (Seiende).In order to justify these two theses, we tried to show that Heidegger was aware of the need to radicalize the ontological questions developed in its initial work to overcome the shortcomings and the problems of modern metaphysics. We have observed that Heidegger considers necessary to return to Kant to lead a discussion on the possibility of a more radical concept of freedom since he establishes at the end of a long and thorough work of interpretation that the Schellingian conception of freedom explained by the idea of autonomy is simply a justification of the principle of the Kantian doctrine of freedom. Having identified main objections addressed by Heidegger to the Kantian and schellingian conceptions of freedom, we have endeavored to demonstrate that the concept of transcendence is the central concept of heideggerian radicalization and the Heideggerian concept of transcendence could not reshape the Kantian concept in a radical perspective.We concluded that it is not enough to presume simply a difference between Being (Sein) and being (Seiende) and the abyss as the basis for this difference to be able to proceed with the radicalization of metaphysics. It appears also necessary to question not the terms of the difference but precisely the difference as such with all its aspects. The question of difference is promising a genuine revolution in philosophical thought that is expected since its first inception. In our opinion, it is even during formulation of the question of the difference that we could finally project on the possibilities unexplored so far and unexploited of our existence, and achieve thus a metamorphosis in our Dasein and finally become truly free.