A study on the origin and limits of philosophical language in terms of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language

In this study, the basic problems of traditional philosophy of language in the process starting from Plato and the concept of 'linguistic turn' in the twentieth century, and a new understanding of language philosophy in this period, are examined in Ludwig Wittgenstein's early work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and his late work Philosophical Philosophy. The problems raised within the framework of the investigations are discussed. The defining feature of this new period can be determined as doubting the meaning in language and formulating the search for the traditional ideal language. Early on, Wittgenstein argues that the logical structure of language has limits to meaning (true or false). So far, philosophy has gone beyond the limits of language and produced unreal metaphysical problems. However, when Wittgenstein makes the distinction between what can be talked about and what cannot be talked about, he does not give any reason other than the fact that what cannot be talked about is not a proposition of natural science. Much of philosophy involves attempts to say the unsayable: "Whatever we can say can be said clearly." Beyond this, nothing—religion, morality, aesthetics, mysticism—can be discussed. Metaphysical statements are meaningless. The only propositions of natural science that can be true or false and have meaning in these respects. In the late period, with the concept of 'language games', Wittgenstein moves away from both the traditional philosophy of language that language is a representative tool and the understanding of 'ideal language', which is one of the fundamental points of early philosophy. In this period, it returns to the understanding of everyday language, which can be expressed as language gaining its meaning according to its purpose of use. In our study, the distinctions and definitions of natural science, philosophy, metaphysics and the mystical that Wittgenstein put forward in his early philosophy, in terms of their relations with language, and the concepts he 252 put forward in the second period, such as 'language games,' 'grammar,' 'private language,' are discussed. In both periods, Wittgenstein mainly dealt with the 'logic of language'. In a way that makes the philosophy of both periods understandable, Wittgenstein says that the first condition of doing philosophy is to doubt grammar. In both periods, he doubted the philosophical language and brought two different solutions. In the first period, he developed an alternative understanding of ideal language to everyday language, with the influences of Frege and Russell, and distinguished metaphysical propositions from mystical propositions. He wanted to solve the problems of philosophy by making determinations between what can be talked about and what is not. However, this approach itself contains a contradiction because, in his own words, it means talking about what cannot be talked about. Besides, this approach cannot explain the linguistic structures of metaphysical and mystical propositions. That is, in fact, philosophy cannot develop an encompassing system for philosophical language. In the second period, although he seems to reject the first period, he actually puts forward a system that will include it. Because an ideal symbolic language can be seen as a language game that produces meaningfulness in itself, rather than being the only source of true meaning in language. In this respect, Wittgenstein's second period has a feature that does not reject the first period but includes it. However, since the second period understanding of language explains meaningfulness in language through language games, it is insufficient to explain how language games emerge, what the relationships between language games are, and ultimately, what the whole language is. In other words, it is essentially insufficient to explain the relations between language, thinking, thought, meaning and reality.