Ahlaki tehlikenin görüldüğü servis hizmetleri ile ilgili makaleler

The main focus of this thesis is incentive design in service operations characterized by moral hazard with hidden action. We study two different problems: the incentive design problem for salespeople in settings where companies offer a bundle of products and services and a pricing problem for service co-production in knowledge intensive services. We develop analytical frameworks for both settings and derive comparative statics related to the problem parameters of both models. For the first problem we corroborate many of the results in the sales force compensation literature and also by modeling the customer state dynamics we analyze the effect of product and service characteristics of the firm on sales force compensation. For the second setting we provide a framework to analyze the pricing problem in service co-production by considering output as a joint effort by both the firm and the client, uncertainty in the environment, and the risk preferences of both the firm and the client.