Arama friksiyonlarıyla bilgi asimetrisi altında sıralayıcı eşleşme

We analyze a two-sided decentralized search model with transferable utility where heterogeneous sellers and buyers engage in costly search due to time discounting under one-sided information asymmetry. We assume exogenous type distribution which remains una ected by the consummated matches in the market throughout time. We prove that in such an economy where two types of uninformed sellers and informed buyers are present, assortative matching could be achieved as equilibrium. We show that supermodularity and logsupermodularity of seller-, buyer-speci c output functions and their sum along with a higher spread rate for sellers' output function compared to buyers' is necessary and su cient for assortative matching under any search friction and type distribution. We also nd that one-sided information asymmetry does not induce less restrictive asuumptions for assortative matching compared to complete information setting where type heterogeneity is limited to two. Keywords: assortative matching, information asymmetry, search friction, assignment, log-supermodularity