A doctrinal approach to Atatürk's concept of area defense through the context of the 1940 French defense strategy

This study focuses on the military administrative approach and tactical orientations in the Battles of Sakarya (1921) and France (1940). Accordingly, it aims to present a doctrinal framework by providing examples of the perspectives of the respective general staffs, the psychological factors influencing command, and the impact of geographical conditions. The study explores how the concepts inherited from the rise of firearms in the 1600s—such as the line of fire, defensive line, and the notions of active/passive resistance and counterattack systems—were manifested in the Paris-Berlin dichotomy and how the two schools of thought applied these principles on the battlefield. One of the study's objectives is to provide a military example of how two battles fought in vastly different geographies and power contexts demonstrated similar doctrinal tendencies. The study highlights two major turning points in military theory: the periods of 1870–1914 and 1917–1940. The first marks the initial rise of the German school, in which strong defensive lines failed to withstand offensive operations. The second turning point occurred when the Germans developed the blitzkrieg doctrine through mechanized warfare techniques. The Battle of Sakarya is analyzed in this context as a scene of Turkish success despite the absence of full infrastructure and the use of hybrid tactics associated with the second turning point. In the clashes of the 1940 Invasion of France, the second phase of German superiority is examined through the technical structure that overcame trench warfare, with examples of French military errors. The study introduces the solutions found by the Turkish and German sides in the face of static offense and defense during the operations in Sakarya and France. Military techniques are explained in a comparative manner through a chronological narrative of the events and military assessments.