Bütçe kısıtı altında sıralı ihaleler: Türkiye 4N spektrum ihalesi

Auction is a method to find an answer for how to assign goods and at what prices. In auctions, sellers usually aim at maximizing auction revenue; whereas, the bidders concern with their own payoffs with respect to their valuations and object prices. Auction theory is an interesting commercial application of game theory and spectrum auctions have a special position in it due to high amount of revenues and complex auction designs. Basically, spectrum is a range of frequencies which is being used for different purposes such as TV broadcasting and mobile telecommunication services. Although it is not a depletable resource like oil reserves or mines, it is still scarce and valuable due to limited available range. For this reason, this strategic public resource should be assigned properly and contribute public welfare. Telecommunications became the most noticeable area of spectrum usage due to its undeniable role in our daily routines or commercial activities. At the very beginning, 2G services introduced SMS and voice call and these services changed our daily life considerably with GSM 900. After the launch of 3G, mobile services gained a different dimension and data has become the main actor of the telecommunication market by using 2100MHz band for UMTS services. Increasing traffic and desire for higher speed resulted in implementation of a new technology called 4G and allocation of additional spectrum in 800MHz and 2600MHz bands for LTE services. In order to assign spectrum to wireless communication providers, governments usually design and organize similar auctions. By auction design, governments aim at efficient usage of available spectrum, downstream competition in the market and reasonable amount of auction revenue which should be convincing for their tax-payers. In 2015, new spectrum auction is planned to be conducted, which aims at providing LTE services in Turkey by next January. The design of Turkish 4G auction is quite similar with previous 3G auction which was conducted in 2008. However, this time everything is more complicated since the number of auctioned blocks increase from 3 to 20. In the previous auction, allocation of 2100 MHz band was the only concern , but now there are 5 different bands which are going to be allocated by sequential auctions. After September 2016, the license owners are allowed to use 900 MHz band for UMTS(3G) services. When we focus on each band separately 800MHz, 900MHz,and 2100MHz auctions might subject to low competition and final prices are expected to be more or less announced reserve prices. Usually, the highest competition occurs in 800MHz band but Turkish auction differs from other auctions in this part. Instead of 800MHz, 1800MHz and 2600MHz bands will be the challenging part of this huge auction which will assign 390MHz spectrum in total. Second chapter of the thesis covers basic auction types and recently implemented some other models. It briefly explains simultaneous and sequential auction concepts. There is also some information about package bidding rather than selling objects individually. Combinatorial clock auction is introduced at the end of this section as the most well-known implementation of package based auction design. In third chapter, the brief history of Turkish spectrum auctions and details of upcoming 4G auction could be found. Basically, upcoming 4G auction has two main stages. First, all participants will submit their sealed envelopes one week prior to auction and after that auction will start with open ascending phase on 26th of May. Activity rules, size of blocks, caps and all other information could be found within this part of the paper. In last section, there is a model which resolves Turkish 4G auction based on some assumptions. Classical auction theory usually does not pay attention to budget constraints and overlooks this fact. On the other hand, there are still some models concerning budget constraints which illustrate that the sequence of auctioned objects affects auction revenue in multi-object auctions. It is better for auctioneer to sell more valuable object prior to others. The main goal of this study is to show that this argument still valid when each bidder has a different private value for auctioned objects. In spectrum auctions, private value assumption is necessary since these licenses would generate different revenues for different winners. Each company has different ARPU, market share and different expectations for future revenues. Prior to auction, each bidder sets its own budget constraint and price thresholds considering the net present values of LTE related future revenue along with its additional cost. In appendices, the proof of the claim is explained in detail.