A critical perspective on the debate between natural law and legal positivism in contemporary legal philosophy

In this study, the debate between natural law and legal positivism, and the reflection of this debate in contemporary legal philosophy, are examined from a critical perspective. In this context, the legal theories of the representatives of legal positivism including Austin, Kelsen, Hart and Raz, as well as those of Fuller, Finnis and Alexy, who advocate the natural law tradition, are analysed. This analysis is confined to the issues of the nature, source and validity of law and the debate between natural law and legal positivism is comparatively evaluated within this framework. The primary aim of this evaluation is to contend that, in contemporary legal philosophy, the traditional strict dichotomy between the natural law and legal positivism schools is not maintained; rather an approach aimed at reconciling these two schools is adopted, particularly by natural law theorists. In line with this objective, the fundamental claims of the natural law and legal positivism schools have been re-questioned. This questioning, also reveals another aim of the study. The second aim of the study is to demonstrate that, contrary to common belief, the natural law school does not entirely reject the factual dimension of law, nor does legal positivism completely deny the existence of value-based elements.