Çok-segmentli şirketler ve şirket içi kaynak dağılımı üzerine makaleler

This thesis focuses on diversified firms and the effect of diversification on the efficiency of internal capital markets. In particular, the first chapter uses the passage of state antitakeover laws as exogenous agency shocks that increase managerial slack in order to test whether agency problems affect the efficiency of resource allocation in internal capital markets. Takeover market is one of the major disciplinary mechanisms on management, antitakeover laws reduce takeover threats and as a result exacerbate agency problems. By using antitakeover laws as exogenous agency shocks, this paper provides the first causal evidence that agency problems distort winner-picking behavior in internal capital markets in support of models with agency frictions. We estimate Q-sensitivity of investment models and compare the sensitivity of capital expenditures to industry investment opportunities, proxied by industry Q, for conglomerate segments and standalone firms. The main finding of the paper is that conglomerate segments become less responsive to investment opportunities following the adoption of antitakeover laws while there is no change in Q-sensitivity of investment of standalone firms. The decline in Q-sensitivity of investment is more pronounced for conglomerates with higher ex-ante likelihood of hostile takeovers. Furthermore, the adverse impact of antitakeover laws is smaller on conglomerates with alternative disciplinary mechanisms. In particular, financial leverage and concentrated institutional ownership as alternative governance mechanisms mitigate the negative impact of antitakeover laws on conglomerate firms. The decline in investment-Q sensitivity is also greater for conglomerates with higher diversity of investment opportunities consistent with the idea that internal power struggles lead to inefficient resource allocation in internal capital markets. The second chapter investigates how industry concentration that a diversified firm operates affects the value of diversification and explores the strategic value of agency problems in product markets for conglomerates that operate mainly in concentrated industries. I present evidence that conglomerates that operate mainly in concentrated industries have higher diversification values. Agency theories suggest that agency problems lead to value-destroying diversification; on the other hand, agency problems may create strategic value in product markets for conglomerates. Matsusaka and Nanda (2002) argue that investment flexibility and the ability to shift resources across divisions prevents conglomerates from committing credibly to a particular industry in case of competitive threats (commitment cost of internal capital markets). Their model suggest that agency problems could create strategic advantage as conglomerates with agency problems can credibly commit to aggressive investment strategies in case of increased competitive pressure instead of shifting resources to other divisions and exiting the threatened industry. I show that agency problems, on average, lead to greater diversification discount consistent with agency theories. In contrast, agency problems in concentrated conglomerates create strategic advantage and lead to greater diversification values consistent with the argument that these conglomerates can credibly commit to their industries when competitive threats arise. The third chapter further investigates the effect of industry concentration on the value of diversification. In order to show that industry concentration has a causal impact on the value of diversification, I follow Fresard (2010) and use large import tariff reductions as exogenous competitive shocks. Concentrated conglomerates experience significant decline in their valuations when their segments are hit by competitive shocks. I further present segment-level evidence and show that concentrated conglomerates stay in the threatened industry and try to defend their market positions when their segments in less-competitive industries experience exogenous competitive shocks. These results suggest that concentrated conglomerates enjoy their market positions in less competitive industries and have higher valuations. When these concentrated conglomerates are hit by competitive shocks, their market positions in less-competitive industries weaken and their value of diversification decrease significantly. Concentrated conglomerates respond aggressively to competitive threats in order to defend their positions in less competitive industries.