The concept of radical evil in Kantian ethics and Arendt's political philosophy

This thesis aims to analyze the concept of "radical evil" in the ethical inquiry of Immanuel Kant and political philosophy of Hannah Arendt. According to Kant, moral law is the foundation of individual freedom and foundation his ethical inquiry. In this respect, Kant defines radical evil as the rejection of moral law and of the possibility of free will. In Hannah Arendt's analysis, this concept necessitates an inquiry into certain human activities and forms of togetherness. A human togetherness is established through the action and plurality (as its condition for action) that are possible in the public realm. This study includes two main sections: the first part includes an investigation of the origin of the concepts of "good", "evil" and "radical evil" in Kantian ethics and their connection with the law of pure practical reason. In the second part, action and its condition plurality and the importance of the public realm in Arendt's political philosophy, are investigated. Consequently, both philosophers ground the concept of radical evil in the possibilities of action and free choice. According to Kant, radical evil is the rejection of the imperative of pure practical reason, therefore, radical evil occurs when human individuals determine their actions based on self-love. In addition, radical evil in Arendt is a fact that originates from the elimination of the possibility of action, speech and the public realm like in totalitarian regimes. Therefore, Arendt's conceptualization involves an assessment of the general human condition, not the will of individuals. Keywords: Radical evil, banality of evil, moral law, human condition, action, plurality, public realm