Conceptual and factual relativity and realism: A Theory of absolutism regarding microphysical facts and concepts

Conceptual relativity emerges from Hilary Putnam's argument referred to as "Carnap and the Polish Logician" and Ernest Sosa's argument referred to as "the Explosion of Reality". It is a genuine phenomenon despite Donald Davidson's rejections, but it does not entail factual relativity as Michael Lynch argues. Furthermore, Lynch's position is not compatible with metaphysical and alethic realism as he claims. Previous positions defending or rejecting factual relativity claim either all of the facts are relative, or none of them are. Only Ernest Sosa argued that solely philosophically abstracted facts are absolute. I take his lead of non-maximalism regarding factual relativity and offer my own alternative as absolute facts. My theory offers that what is referred to as ideal microphysical subvenient first-order facts in David Armstrong's physicalist and naturalist metaphysics should be the only absolute part of the factual reality. But unlike Armstrong, I argued for a one-way, non-reciprocal supervenience between the first order and second order facts. Similarly exhibiting an asymmetrical structure, absolute facts do not correspond but respond to relative propositions while generating truth. Also, relative schemes are not commensurable with the absolute scheme, but they are mensurable in it. Dealing with all these issues, the thesis becomes an introduction to a brave new theory of factual reality, truthmaking and conceptual schemes, still maintaining the initial idea of compatibility between conceptual relativity and metaphysical and alethic realism.