Diplomatic coercion: Theorizing and measuring diplomatic sanctions

This dissertation investigates the role of diplomatic sanctions in world politics by focusing on their coercive potential. While states frequently employ diplomatic sanctions for various foreign policy purposes, little is known about their true functionality, thanks to the lack of adequate scholarly attention. To better understand the dynamics of diplomatic sanctions and how they interplay with other coercive tools, this dissertation aims, first, to develop an appropriate analytical and theoretical framework to analyze diplomatic sanctions within the broader concept of coercion; second, to identify the peculiar characteristics of diplomatic sanctions that distinguish them from other coercive and non-coercive instruments in order to evaluate their comparative utility; third, to determine the conditions under which states are more likely to employ diplomatic sanctions through a comprehensive analysis of the potential explanatory variables; finally, to uncover the signaling value of diplomatic sanctions by analyzing whether or not they predict the use of other coercive tools - namely economic sanctions and military measures in subsequent encounters. To do so, this dissertation primarily uses the new Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset, compiled as part of this project, and adopts both quantitative as well as qualitative research methodology, which includes mini case studies. Consistent with the existing literature, the results of the onset analyses indicate that democracies are less likely to use diplomatic sanctions against one another but more likely to employ them, especially against non-democracies, and they are also more likely to be the targets of these sanctions. Additionally, the propensity to employ diplomatic sanctions is higher between joint members of IGOs and allies, which are commonly considered to have conflict-reducing effects. Intuitively, rivalry increases the probability of diplomatic sanctions onset. The results suggest that relative power capabilities and economic interdependence do not have significant effects on their initiation. In addition, the study also demonstrates that while diplomatic sanctions can be employed as one of the initial steps to escalate the pressure on the target state gradually, they can also communicate the intention of de-escalation between rivals.