Ex-post yatırım kararları içeren ortak değer ihalelerin dengeleri

I study a two-unit uniform-price auction with three participants who have unit demands. Before an auction, each participant receives a discrete signal that can take two (qualitatively different) values - l or h. After the auction, each winner needs to make an ex-post investment decision that will affect the value of the object. Hence, the values are determined jointly by the signal and ex-post investment decision. I characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of monotone and non-monotone equilibria. I find that for some parameters, only non-monotone equilibria are possible. In addition, except for one class of monotone and non-monotone equilibria, the equilibrium behavior supposes that some agents choose to bid the same bid irrespective of the signal they receive. However, the players with qualitatively different signals cannot pool at the same bid in any (monotone or not) equilibrium of the model. Keywords: Common value auctions, Monotonicity.