Fantastik duvarlar nelerdir ve nerede bulunurlar: Sınır tahkimatına yanıt

Why do not all Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA) modify their strategies and tactics equally in response to border fortification? The global rise in border wall construction has been extensively studied in the context of affluent countries, while a significant gap in understanding the outcomes of this phenomenon in developing countries still exists. This study examines the effects of border fortification on transnational militancy. I argue that this relation is moderated by several intra- and extra-group dynamics. In this thesis, I devise a "theory of change" proposing that groups are only encouraged to shift in the long-term strategies when they fail to compensate for the loss delivered by fortification. VNSAs also find incentives in the reallocation of the existing resources and reduce the cost of their violent tactics by adopting more cost-effective approaches, driven by the setbacks caused by fortification. After employing logit models with interactions, my findings suggest that fortification, in combination with foreign support, increases the likelihood of civilian targeting and the use of irregular weapons by VNSAs. Yet, only groups that were able to operate "differently across attacks" before fortification demonstrate a tendency towards using irregular weapons. Additionally, I found evidence that the interaction between fortification and state violence encourages selective targeting by VNSAs.