Gerçek efor kullanımında ara dönem performans geribildiriminin stratejik aktarımı: Deneysel delil

In workplaces and schools, interim performance feedback is among the popularly used tools in improving further work motivation and productivity. In some cases and contexts the truthfulness of such feedback can be verified, in others managers or teachers can manipulate the information strategically. In this study, we experimentally analyze the effect of different interim performance feedback mechanisms on the self-confidence of workers, as well as their decisions and future performance, in a ?one principal-two agent? context with real effort. We manipulate (1) the verifiability of information, (2) whether the feedback can be given to agents privately or has to be announced publicly. We confirm the theoretical hypothesis that information transmission about the true outcomes of agents occurs only in verifiable feedback mechanisms, including both private and public announcement cases. Yet, agents also show some non-standard behavior, such as not interpreting "no feedback" as negatively as they should, and being influenced by other agents' outcomes although these should be irrelevant. Considering principal behavior, we observe a general tendency to truth-tell, against the theoretical prediction. We also report some results on gender: women are more optimistic than men when strategically given no feedback. Keywords: Lab experiments, Performance feedback, Strategic information transmission, Cheap-talk, Self-confidence, Lying, Gender