Freedom of expression and disinformation: The Ethiopian example

Over the last couple of years, the explosion of disinformation in the digitally networked sphere has become one of the most consequential challenges facing countries around the world. In response to this mounting concern, countries are experimenting with different strategies, including the adoption of new legislation which penalizes false and misleading contents. Ethiopia is among those countries that have taken similar legislative measures as it has long been bedeviled by online proliferation of manipulative and violence-inciting contents at a scale that threatens the public order and national security. Against that backdrop, this study aims to analyze Ethiopia's legislative response to digital disinformation and critically evaluates its normative compliance with global standards of freedom of expression. In fragile and politically polarized countries like Ethiopia, the adverse impact of digital disinformation goes far beyond eroding the public's faith in democratic institutions, if there is any, and deteriorating the quality of political discourses. Synergized with their susceptibility to offline ethnic violence, the rapid spread of online disinformation is rather an existential threat – an issue of life and death in these countries. Accordingly, the central question raised in this research is how, not whether, to regulate the dissemination of online disinformation without unduly infringing individuals' freedom of expression. As is well known, freedom of expression is universally acknowledged as the bedrock of democratic governance and one of the basic conditions for each individual's self-fulfillment. However, as a qualified right, it can also be subject to certain limitations on the condition that such limitations are provided by law, pursue one of the legitimate aims enumerated in human rights instruments, necessary and proportionate. There is a commonly held assumption that criminal punishment for the dissemination of disinformation constitutes a disproportionate restriction of the right to freedom of expression. Without dismissing the valid normative claim that such regulatory intervention on disinformation practice bears a significant burden of justification, this thesis attempts to deconstruct that assumption arguing that criminal sanction would not necessarily violate the principle of proportionality as long as the law is enacted to address exigent public concerns (pressing social need) and tailored in a narrowly circumscribed way to avoid unintended consequences/chilling effects.