İki aşamalı tedarik zincirlerinde paket fiyatlandırma

What is the right promotion strategy a firm should pursue to stimulate demand and increase revenue? Many retailers and researchers propose a broad range of promotion strategies to answer this question. In this dissertation, we investigate the bundle pricing practice, as an alternative and less-studied form of promotion strategy. In the first part of the dissertation, we study the one-time bundle pricing problem in a single-seller/single-buyer supply chain where the seller sells two different products. One of the products has excess inventory and the seller aims to clear the inventory by offering the one-time bundle offer. The main research objective of this chapter is to examine when it is beneficial to extend a one-time bundle offer to the buyer in lieu of an individual price reduction for the product with the excess inventory. To address this question, we model a game in a Stackelberg setting. Through a range of numerical experiments, our results suggest that when the targeted inventory liquidation quantity is not too high, the seller can be better off with the bundle offer. In the second part, we study a multi-segment market in which a retailer aims to clear the inventory of a product by bundling it with a second product which is independently valued by the consumers, i.e., neither substitute nor complement. We investigate the question of how dynamic and segment-specific bundle pricing impacts retailer's revenue. We develop a revenue model that integrates the dynamic and segment-specific aspects of the pricing decisions, and present a computational study to analyze their revenue impact relative to a price promotion for the individual item only. The results indicate that the bundle offers are most effective when the initial inventory of the item under consideration is high. The results also demonstrate that dynamic pricing is beneficial when the initial inventory of the item is low. An additional revenue improvement is observed when the price of the bundle is dynamically optimized. Segment-specific pricing has no direct impact on revenue when prices are static; segment-specific and dynamic pricing, however, can bring about substantial revenue improvements that are an increasing function of the initial inventory level of the item. We also consider the correlation in consumers' valuations of the bundled products and show that dynamically priced and segment-specific bundle offers yield a robust revenue performance, reducing the negative impact of positive correlation in consumers' valuations of the products on the retailer's revenue. In the third part of the dissertation, we explore the impact of strategic customers and the degree of substitutability among the products on the long-run per period revenue that the retailer can achieve through temporary bundle offers. We develop a strategic customer model to characterize the optimal purchasing and consumption policies in a multi-product setting. We address the question of how a strategic customer's purchasing behavior, and characteristics of products in the bundle affect the retailer's revenue. We derive a closed-form expression of the optimal bundle price for a given promotion frequency in a setting where customers do not purchase the two products separately. Our results demonstrate that retailers should adjust their promotion policy (i.e., depth and frequency) with respect to 1) the characteristics of products that form the bundle, and 2) the market structure. Our findings suggest that when the products show a degree of substitutability, the retailer should present bundle offers with higher discount levels, and less frequently. When the bundle offer includes complementary products, the retailer should extend bundle offers with smaller discounts and more frequently.