A comparative case between al-Māturīdī and Alvin Plantinga's responses to the problem of evil

The problem of evil is undoubtedly one of the strongest arguments atheists have advanced for the non-existence of God. The difficulty of the problem becomes even more conspicuous when the "goodness" of God is taken into account. This thesis examines some arguments designed to show the inaccuracy of the inherent claim of the problem of evil, which is that God and evil cannot coexist. To this end, the arguments proposed by Abū Mansūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) and Alvin Plantinga (b. 1932) will be discussed throughout this thesis. After exploring the arguments of the two theologians, their proposed solutions will be evaluated and then compared with each other. In the end, I shall argue that the arguments presented by both al-Māturīdī and Plantinga stand firmly in terms of their philosophical claim. Furthermore, I shall show that these two arguments differ in two important aspects but similar in an essential one.