A study on the procedural fairness in non-cooperative games and two-sided stable matching problems

In this thesis, the procedural fairness concept in games is studied on the basis of game theory. The fairness concept in zero-sum normal form games with two players is investigated. Afterwards, a method regarding how procedurally unfair normal form and perfect information extensive form games can be transformed into procedurally fair games is presented. The procedural fairness concept and various fairness approaches regarding the definition of end state fairness in games are compared and a synthesis is presented. Afterwards, the conditions which guarantees equilibria to be stable and fair are researched by studying the relation between fairness and stability in equilibria of games based on current literature. Eventually, procedurally fair algorithms and algorithms with end state fairness are presented for two-sided stable matching problem. These algorithms which are examined under three headings are analyzed by using the measures such as runtime complexity, stability in results, egalitarianism, equitability and rank averages.