Free action on Kant and Spinoza

In this study, free action os discussed on the basis of Immanuel Kant and Benedictus-Baruch de Sponoza's definition of the concept of freedom. In the first part, ot os discussed why the concept of freedom is considered as an idea and creates an illusion on the basis of the distinction between the concept of phenomenon and noumenon on Kant's work called Critique of Pure Reason, and on the contonuation, it is discussed how the concept of freedom os possible on the sensible field where mechanical causality occurs, and how freedom, which is the concept of the intelligible field, is possible on the Metaphysocs of Morals. The possibility that it is a phenomenon has been tried to be discussed on the basis of him works called Grounding, Critique of Practical Reason and Critique of Judgment. In the thord part of thos study, Spinoza's concept of freedom is discussed on the basis of him works titled Ethics, Letters and Treatise on the Correction of the Understanding. Although this study does not present an example of contrast or opposition over Kant and Sponiza's understanding of freedom, its main goal is to discuss how their thoughts operate on the differences on understanding on the concept of causality and the form of intellectual/intuitive judgment.