Rus dış politikasında enerjinin araçsallaşması ve Avrupa Birliği enerji politikasına etkileri

The increasing energy needs in European countries resulting from the rapid growth of manufacturing and other industrial sectors have rendered inevitable the institution of energy relations with geographically close energy producer countries such as Norway, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia and most importantly Russia. Though the EU-Russia energy relations followed a stable and constructive path throughout several decades, the mutually beneficial energy relationship turned into a vulnerable one in the last ten years following the accession to power of Vladimir Putin. From that time onwards, Putin has formulated systematically a number of principles and approaches towards the energy resources of the country. In this context, holding thelargesthydrocarbon reservesin the world, Russia appears to beunique and the largest producer of oil as well as gas, and these resources have beena key element inthe economic and political position of Russia and its relations with neighboring and European countries. The Russiandominanceonthe two products important for the European economy and its use of energy resources as a political tool to restore its influence in the region andstrengthen its position in the international arena concerned countries of the former Soviet bloc. Some European countries such as the Baltic countries meet almost all its oil and gas needs by imports from Russia. This level of dependence onRussian resources and Russia's effortsto establisha foreign policybased onits energy resources create an energy securitydilemmafor the EU. Consistent with its approach to national security, Russia seeks to establisha sphere of influenceinneighboring countries, a policy that is in direct conflictwith the interestsand policies ofthe EU in the energy-producing countries where EU seeks to build new relationships, but also in the"common neighborhood" including member states of Eastern Europe. More conscious of the absolute dependence of the EU countries on Russian energy supplies, the EU Commission embarked on formulating a reasonable strategy vis-à-vis Russia in order to aleviate the energy dependence of the Member States on the energy superpower. Following the crisis of 2006 between Russia and Ukraine which left the Europeans without energy in the middle of winter, it doubled its efforts to implement a two-fold strategy which, on the one hand, as part of the EU's institutionalist and normative approach, has stepped up the multilateral efforts oriented to consolidation of EU energy market vis-à- vis Moscow on the internal level and to exporting its own market principles to Russia on the external level and on the other hand tried to diversify the energy supplies of the Union through pipelines transferring alternative resources to that of Russia. In this respect, while the Union tried to develop fully liberalised and competitive internal gas and and electricity markets through a series of packages of energy directives in order to utilise the considerable potential of the EU internal market for its energy security and to unify the Member States against the monopolistic actions of Gazprom on the internal level, it tried to export its market principles to Russia through Energy Charter Treaty and Energy Dialogue. However, becausethe approaches of member states are inconsistent with regard to such a policy, it is very difficult to establish an integratedand liberalizedmarket, which is partly due tothe reluctance ofcountries to transfertheirauthorityonenergy securityto a supranational institution, and partly to their pursuit of national energy interests. To counter the Commission's efforts to break Russian dominance over the European energy markets, Russian government in its turn tries to widen the gap with the so-called divide and rule strategy by dealing with the leading countries within the Union on a bilateral basis. And this strategy constituted a major obstacle for the EU efforts to formulate a common policy against Russia. In this regard, in the light of the dynamic foreign policy that Russia pursues with the use of its energy resources, and of the dependence of EU on these resources and the division among the member countries on a common policy energy, this thesisaims to providean assessment of energy relations between EU and Russia on the basisof the respective approaches of the two parties to international relations,in other words, the Russian geopolitical realism against the institutionalism of the EU. In this thesis, which consists of two parts, we will address, in the first part, the development of Russian energy resources as a determinant in the foreign policy. In thisrespect, first, we willportraythe Russian energy profile and then focus onthe history of the development of energy industries from the Soviet era until the 2000s by focusing on the transformation that these industrieshaveexperienced during the privatizationof the 1990s andthede-privatization of the Putin years. Thereafter, the problems that foreign investors faced after the nationalization of energy assets and the restoration of state control over the energy industry will be put on the table by focusing on a few striking examples such as Kovykta and Sakhalin. Meanwhile, we will also address the economic crisis of 1998with its immediate impact on the sectorand next the economic recovery resulting from risingenergy prices, and then the problems that the energy sectoris currently experiencing will be discussed with an emphasis on the chronic effects of "Dutch disease" on the Russian economy. Then we will explore the views of Putin on energy resources and his efforts to strengthen the country politically by use of these resources as a strategic tool in bilateral relations with the neighboring countries. In this regard, energy policy of Russia in the former Soviet sphere will be analyzed by also focusing on new players such as the EU, the United States and China which all try to establish energy links inthe region. And the role that China has begun to play in recent years will be analyzed by putting on the table its efforts to acquire a growing power on the reserves of the countries of CentralAsia. In the second part of the thesis, first, we will deal with the energy profile of the EU and the role that Russia plays in the supply of resources that European countries need, and with the evolution of the energy relationship between Russia and the EU. And then the approaches of the two parties to the energy links between them will be discussed in the light of their views on international relations,i.e. the geopolitical realism of Russia and the multilateral institutionalism of EU.As a result, we will take a look at Europe's efforts to export its market principles to Russia by the Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Dialogue and then the Russian response to these initiatives by the strategy of "divide and rule" aimed at hindering coherence within the EU. In this context, we will also address thebilateralization of Russian energy relations (especially in the field of gas) with the EU by putting emphasis on its relationship with the majors of Europe such as Germany,France and Italy. In the last chapter of the second part, options and challenges to opportunities for diversification of EU gas supplies will be put ontablefocusing onshale gasas a realadditional resource, but not alternative, to Russian gas. In this chapter, it will be admitted that there are many alternatives to Russian natural gas for Europe to choose from, but it would be difficult, if not impractical, for Europe to consider replacing all Russian natural gas imports. Some EU countries and companies also appear reluctant to shift significantly from the status quo. Some of Europe's larger natural gas companies have huge financial interests in maintaining Russian supplies and do not see a problem in depending so much on one country. It is important to keep in mind that Russia not only holds the largest supplies of natural gas globally, but already has significant infrastructure connecting its resources to Europe. A major test for the EU in developing a more coherent energy policy for Europe could be how to balance these views with those of other member states that are more dependent on Russian energy and are concerned by the political leverage Russia could exert on parts of Europe if no alternatives are found to alleviate at least some of that dependence. The Caspian and Central Asian reserves offer an opportunity to lessen the EU's energy dilemma with Russia, both in terms of production and transit of gas. Geographical isolation of the Central Asian and caspian states and the lack of independent natural gas pipelines from Russia makes it difficult to forge an energy relationship between those states and Europe. However the main problem lies in the lack of a coherent European strategy to bring their reserves to European consumer states, which would convince the Central Asian and Caspian States about the European firmness to build a real energy partnership with themselves. In North Africa, ongoing governmental transitions in Libya and Egypt are a key factor for natural gas development. Both countries have large natural gas resources, but political constraints have limited the development of these resources. Meanwhile, new discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean pose a potential new source of European natural gas. However, neither Israel nor Cyprus has any experience in developing large scale natural gas projects and they lack any financially reasonable export strategy to reach European markets, which are the two challenging factors that hamper Israeli and Cypriot ambitions to sell their gas reserves to international markets. Regarding the shale gas, it will be stated that 'to what extent shale gas will change the game in Europe is still unclear, and that environmental issues, in the more densely populated parts, will play out as a key factor regarding development of the potential of shale gas in Europe. Shale gas has certainly changed North America's natural gas market; and shale gas enabled the US to remove its energy dependency and, furthermore, to reduce nearly all of its LNG import needs. The combination of this development with the economic recession led to an oversupply of the international LNG market that placed strong downward pressure on gas prices around the world. However shale gas per se has not yet changed the overall energy balance in Europe, nor is it clear if it will materialize before 2020, therefore it's too early to say that a the shale gas sector, which require further elaboration and considerable investments such as LNG liquifaction and regasification facilities will have a dramatic effect on the European energy markets. In the conclusion, it will be suggested that while Russia's politicised and assertive energy policy, and its relatively successful dividing of EU member states allowing it to circumvent EU principles and efforts to diversify energy resources away from Russia may at first sight seem to portray EU/Russia power relations as asymmetric, Russia's domestic market suggests otherwise by highlighting that Russia heavily depends on revenues from the EU market, and will do so for some time in the future, which reveals the interdependency between the two sides. Although Russia owns the world's largest reserves of natural gas, its most important gas fields, in Western Siberia, Yamburg, Urengoy and Mdvezhye which together account for about 60% of Russia's total gas production, have started depleting. Therefore, new gas fields, notably Shtokman off-shore in the arctic Barents Sea and the gas fields of the arctic Yamal peninsula need to be developed urgently and taken on stream. This, however, is an extremely costly and difficult endeavour, since these fields are located in geographically rough areas in the far North, and are thus hostile to technology and equipment, while requiring long stretches of pipeline transport. The development of new gas fields will therefore constitute a considerable financial burden on Gazprom. In thelight of these prospects, there is increasing concern whether Gazprom will actually be able to meet its contractual commitments while satisfying its domestic demand in future. While the IEA estimates that Gazprom needs to invest US$ 17 billion per year until 2030 in extraction and production undertakings as well as in maintenance of current pipeline infrastructure for this purpose, some even argue that the development of new gas fields is impossible on the basis of Russia's resources alone. This judgement seems especially plausible when bearing in mind that most other sectors of the Russian economy are not competitive internationally, and can hence not sufficiently fund the development of Russia's energy sector. These findings corroborate that Russia heavily depends on EU demand to maintain and increase the production of its energy sector and to modernise the rest of its economy. Currently, an overwhelming 70% of Russian gas exports go to the EU. The Community thus generates up to two thirds of Gazprom's annual earnings, although it only accounts for 25% of its total production. In this connection, it must be noted that Gazprom is of enormous economic importance to the Kremlin: it is Russia's most important earner of hard currency, and its tax payments make up one quarter of federal annual revenues of the Russian state. Therefore, though Russian state sees energy as a foreign policy tool from a realist perspective, it also has strong economic incentives to avoid conflicting energy relations with the EU, to avoid putting vital government funds at risk. While Moscow repeatedly articulates plans to export more of its gas eastwards when energy cooperation with the EU is uneasy with the prospect of EU restrictions on Russian downstream investments, its pipeline infrastructure currently binds it to Europe. As pipeline grids take many years to construct and require substantial additional investments, new pipelines going eastwards are unlikely to be an immediate priority for Gazprom given its current investment challenge. Furthermore, the prospects for exports to Asian markets, notably to China, still seem less attractive than current relationships with the EU, as Beijing is to date not willing to pay European prices. Consequently, despite the existence of considerable conflict potential and inherently different approaches to their energy relation, it seems that it is hardly possible for Russia to replace Europe as the main destination of Russian exports of natural gas, at least for some time to come. And certainly it's true of vice versa. It can, therefore, be concluded that for Russia just as for the EU, their energy relations can be described as difficult, but nevertheless essential, and hence it is likely that they will remain bound together for better or worse in the short to medium term future.