Menfaat grupları ve kurumsal değişim

This study proposes an original formal political economy model of institutionalevolution to analyze the effects of evolving interest groups on institutional change byextending the model of Neyaptı (2010). Institutions are categorized as formal (F) andinformal (N) institutions that exhibit different evolutionary patterns. N evolves withcapital accumulation, as in learning by doing, and F is optimally chosen by agovernment who maximizes the weighted sum of the utilities of two different interestgroups. The level of informal institutions, which represents business ethics, way ofdoing business or the level of technological know-how, differs for each group. F andN together define the production technology and affect the income level of eachgroup. The model is such that institutions, as well as the levels of income and capitalstocks are dynamically interrelated. The simulations of the model show that Fexhibits a punctuated evolutionary path. This path is observed to be affected byincome share of the institutions, income share of the capital, saving rate and cost ofinstitutional change.