A philosophical investigation about the problem of consciousness in the context of inquiry into causality

Consciousness is one of the current problems of the philosophy of mind. From a first-person perspective, we assume that the subject knows his own existence intuitively, without needing any further proof. Since this information is not accessible to others, its transfer to third persons is impossible according to our current knowledge and capabilities. Thinkers have tried to define this incompatibility with expressions such as "explanatory gap", "epistemic asymmetry", and "cognitive closure". In our opinion, this difference can be defined as "bilateral selfism". We think that the causality aspect is important in the evaluation of consciousness with conventional approaches. When we look at the approaches that have been going on since antiquity, it is seen that the determinist/necessary causality approach has gradually left its place in the contingent causality approaches. In this study, we acted with the thesis that handling consciousness with the contingent causality approach is more appropriate for human nature. In the second part, we interpreted the causality approaches put forward since ancient times in relation to consciousness. In addition to the comments of Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, and Heidegger, we evaluated the contingent causality approach in its historical development. In the third part, we have included the interpretations and evaluations of contemporary philosophers of mind on consciousness. Among these discussions, there were functional approaches that were reductionist materialist or materialist but not reductionist, as well as evaluations that argued that consciousness could not be the subject of philosophy and science. Some of the studies aimed to overlap the first-person approach with the third-person approach. While there were those who regarded consciousness and the body as separate phenomena, there were also those who argued that consciousness was a condensation of energy in non-human beings. In the fourth chapter, we compared the views of contemporary philosophers of mind with each other and examined their compatible and conflicting aspects. In addition, within the framework of our original views, we have made definitions of expressions such as consciousness, contingency, and contingent causality by touching on the etymological roots of the cause-effect approach. We gave examples that consciousness is not just an epiphenomenal feature. We have given examples showing that the cause-effect dichotomy can be overcome by overcoming the subject-object duality. We have tried to show with examples that the human neurological and genetic system operates with non-deterministic, contingent dynamics and can even function without causal stimulation for an observable effect. It is thought that this study will shed light on future studies on the exposition of consciousness through contingent causation due to the features highlighted above.