Not just another armed actor: Explaining pro-government militia mobilization and participation in civil conflict

Pro-government militias (PGMs) are a critical yet undertheorized actor in civil con- flicts. Current research has not considered what factors lead to PGM participating in internal conflict, leaving a gap in our understanding of the ultimate purpose of PGMs. I test this relationship through the lens of two competing hypotheses: PGMs as force multipliers and PGMs as intelligence gatherers. Using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the Pro-Government Militias Database, I use an Andersen-Gill hazard model and negative binomial regression as well as out-of- sample predictive tests to determine when states will mobilize PGMs and what leads states to utilize multiple PGMs. Results show that the need for intelligence drives states to mobilize new PGMs while both latent military threat and the need for local information contribute to multiple PGM usage. I argue that these results require a revised approach to studies of PGMs, focusing on their intelligence gathering pur- pose rather than treating them as "just another armed actor" in civil conflict. This revision has implications not only for studies of pro-government militias but also for larger, integrated studies of civil conflict.