Ortanca kuralı ve çoğunlukçu uzlaşı

In this thesis, we analyze the relationship between Majoritarian Compromise (Sertel & Y lmaz, 1984) and the Median Rule (Basset & Persky, 1999). We show that, for the populations with odd size, these two rules are equivalent and we describe the relationship for the case where population size is even. Then, we explore some axiomatic properties of Median Rule. It turns out that Median Rule satis es all properties that Majoritarian Compromise sat- is es in Sertel and Y lmaz (1999) and it fails all properties that Majoritarian Compromise fails in Sertel and Y lmaz (1999). We, then, introduce two ax- ioms which di erentiate these rules. We conclude that, the Median Rule can be considered as a viable alternative to Majoritarian Compromise, as it satis- es all axioms that Majoritarian Compromise is known to satisfy except one particular axiom. Keywords: Social Choice, Majoritarian Compromise, Median Rule, Subgame Perfect Implementability