Çelişmezlik ilkesi: Aristoteles için bir savunma denemesi

Aristotle had claimed, in his Metaphysics, that the principle of non-contradiction was an indemonstrable principle. However, according to Aristotle, the indemonstrability of this principle does not constitute an obstacle to understanding of the existence and the truth of such a principle. For this reason, Aristotle had tried to justify the principle of non-contradiction by the method of refutation, in the same work. Although this effort of Aristotle has been appreciated for a long time throughout the history of thought, by the evolution of symbolic logic and by the discovery of so-called contradictory objects, philosophers like Lukasiewicz began to reconsider their thinking about the contradictions. This situation and the indemonstrability of the principle of non-contradiction led these thinkers to question the truth of the principle and the justification of Aristotle. This has resulted in various objections to Aristotle on his justification of this principle and in the fact that the value of the principle was undermined. The reason why we write such a thesis is the fact that we believe that there are some problems regarding these objections and that Aristotle had succeeded in justifying this principle.