An analysis of competition board's concentration decisions within the context of the economic schools

In order to gain sustainable competitive advantages firms implement certain strategies of which one is concentration as an external growth strategy. In literature, altough there is no commonly agreed definition of concentration, commonly stressed point is changing control from one hand to another. Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are means of changing control. M&As are phenomena which is closely related to the society with its economic, social and legal dimensions. M&As may cause certain negative effects over the social welfare. Hence, they are the subjects of the competition regulation and Competition Bodies due to their negative effect over competition. M&As are on the agenda of the Economics Schools since as much they have legal outcomes for the firms they have economic results too, as their theoretical foundations established by the economics schools.During literature review it is seen that, M&As are examined solely in legal or economics or business terms. At this point, it is though that the legal, economics and business aspects of this phenomena are unsperatable hence an attempt made to create a holistic view. According to Law numbered 4054 named ?Law about Protecting Competition? M&As which exceed certain level are subjects to the permission of the Competition Board, starting from this point, the Competition Board?s decisions about concentration between 1997-2006 are analysed within the context of Chicago, Harvard and Australian Schools which have powerful arguments, discourse and tradition. The problematic of this study described as: Taking differences between Harvard, Chicago and Austrian Schools? intrepretation and approach to concentration into account which school?s views are more referred by the Competition Board? At this stage two research questions can be defined:1.After examining all the decisions of the Competition Board which economic school?s views were taken as a base for their decisions?2.Taking Competition Board?s concentration decisions between 1997-2006 into account, were there any changes in their view of economics?To answer these questions, it is necessary to provide more explanation about these matters:a-Of what diamentions should concentration phenomena be included in this research?b-What are all three economic schools? views about these diamentions?To answer these questions, documentation rewiwing method is applied. One reason for this is that ?Board?s decisions are open to the public and it is almost impossible to manipulate them. Board?s decisions are amongst the data with high reliability as they are shared with the public. To investigate the validity of the documents external and internal critic method is applied.In this study concentration term and methods are assessed in legal, economics and business terms. Then, Chicago, Harvard and Australian economics schools? views about anti-trust and particularly concentrations are examined. Next, the connection between the reasons of Competition?s Board?s concentration decisions and the views of the economics schools is made. It is seen that, between 1997-2006 totally 941 decisions were made by the Board of which 579 accepted, 3 dismissed and 41 were given conditional permission. Remaining 318 concentration applications were regarded as `out of the interest? of the Board.With regard to the research questions of this study, it is found out that the Competition Board?s concentration decisions are commonly taken by the view of Harvard School, this is consistent with EU Competition Law which is the source of Turkish law. It is also seen that there is continuity and consistency in applying Harvard Schools?s view in concentrations decisions within the period examined. Under the light of these findings, implications of applying Harvard School?s view are discussed. Compared to the other economics schools, Harvard provide explanations which are closer to the real life and easier to apply. For the firms, the importance of this finding is that when they choose a strategy they must be aware of anti-competitive results and legal restrictions of their strategic behaviours.