Maimonides ve spinoza'da vahiy ve yasa

This dissertation aims to illuminate some aspects of the relationship between the thought of Spinoza and that of Maimonides within the framework of "Jewish philosophy." It is important to note that this intricate and controversial relationship has already been the subject of many studies—some of which are written by the leading scholars of the field of Jewish thought. Those works have indeed opened paths of reflection that have proved to be very fruitful. We are, of course, deeply indebted to these works. On the other hand, one can observe that one of the major trends in scholarly literature is to determine the place of Maimonides's thought among Spinoza's Jewish sources. Although this is perfectly justified and necessary from a historical-philosophical perspective, we decided to adopt here another approach which consists of an effort to establish a dialogue between these two "thinkers of Judaism". To that end, we examine Spinoza's critique of Maimonides in the broader context of his anti-Pharisaic polemic, or, to be more precise, of his refutation of "Pharisaism" i.e. Rabbinic Judaism both on the Biblical and philosophical grounds. So, we argue that, even though the implied reader ("philosophe lector") of the Theological-Political Treatise is most probably an anti-clerical and liberal Christian, or an adherent of the Radical Reformation, Spinoza also conducts in this book an internal dialogue with his former co-religionists, i.e. Jews of Marrano descent. And within this dialogue he takes issue particularly with Maimonides and other "Pharisees." There is no doubt that Spinoza is an avid reader of Maimonides's work. One must also bear in mind that these two authors have read and reread the same Hebrew texts, and, although with radically different points of view, they have contemplated and written on the same issues (such as the nature of God, revelation, prophecy, the Law, the Scripture, the calling of the Jewish people, the place of philosophy vis-à-vis religion). So, even if Spinoza likes to present his opinions as elements of a self-generated philosophy or science (just like his "substance"), it must be noted that these issues and the different ways of approaching them have a long history which is also that of the Jewish Rabbinic tradition. From a historical standpoint, one might possibly distinguish three levels as to the relationship between Spinoza and the Jewish tradition: 1) the Jewish sources of Spinoza, the truly Jewish aspect of his work and the attribution of Jewishness; 2) the interpretation of Judaism (Biblical and Postbiblical/Pharisaic/Rabbinic Judaism) by Spinoza; and finally 3) Spinoza's influence on Jewish thought and history, through specific Jewish receptions of his work. At least in the first two levels, it is absolutely inevitable to study Maimonides's philosophical and Halachic works scrupulously: When he strongly criticizes Pharisaism (that is, Rabbinic Judaism) it is generally Maimonides's thought that Spinoza is debating with. However, the author of the Guide for the Perplexed proves to be the main adversary as well as the privileged interlocutor of Spinoza in the context of his daring exegetical and philosophical undertaking which seeks, among other things, nothing less than to dismantle the pillars of Judaism and Jewishness, and to implement instead a rationalist and naturalistic universalism. Now, in order to better understand the meaning and scope of the Spinozist criticism and "deconstruction" of Rabbinic Judaism, we need to look more closely at Maimonides's reconstruction/reevaluation of the very same tradition. With regard to the Torah and the Sinaitic Revelation, Maimonides seems to agree entirely with the Oral/Talmudic tradition that Spinoza finds rather "false" and "uncertain." Indeed, he refrains from presenting himself as an innovator/reformer both in the field of Halacha (Jewish law) and in that of philosophy. However, it is not difficult to notice that by its scale, its depth and its systematic approach, Maimonides's work changes the very definition of Judaism or the way in which the Judaic corpus is conceived as a revealed Law and teaching. Moreover, this Maimonidean reconstruction of the Rabbinic Judaism are closely linked, in our view, to the "perplexities" that Maimonides seeks to do away with, both through his philosophical magnum opus (The Guide for the Perplexed) and through his Halachic works (above all, the Mishneh Torah). What characterizes this extraordinary undertaking is that it relies (in various ways, of course) on reason and philosophy, for discovering and "communicating" the "secrets of the Law/ Torah," as well as for reorganizing the legal and hermeneutic literature of Rabbinic Judaism. But then again, Spinoza also has a claim on the concepts of "reason" and "philosophy." However, in the Theological-Political Treatise he offers a completely opposite view as to the function and the objective of reason and philosophy vis-à-vis the Torah/Scripture. While Maimonides insists that philosophical speculation can precisely help us to eliminate the doubt and to understand the "secrets of the Law / Torah" (which contains the ultimate physical and metaphysical truths that were revealed to Moses in the Mount Sinai, and expressed in the form of "very obscure allegories" by the prophets and sages of the Talmud); Spinoza claims that the philosophical reason ("Natural Light") offers to the Marrano Jews (as to all mankind) who are perplexed, persecuted and hated by the nations, another way of salvation and blessedness than that can be found in the organized religion and in the Rabbinic Judaism. Thus, with regard to Maimonides and Spinoza, one is dealing with completely different conceptions and uses of reason and philosophy. The same is certainly true of the domain of revealed Law and Scripture: against Maimonides, who assumes that Scripture and commandments have infinite wisdom and profound meanings that can be understood with the help of philosophical reflection, Spinoza maintains that it is imperative to free the Scripture from all sorts of theological-philosophical interpretations and especially from the tutelage of Pharisaism, in order to expose its historical and particular Hebraism, and also to reveal its universal moral teaching, which is implicitly formulated in the "Old Testament" but emerges in the form of "common notions" in "Jesus Christ." To be sure, Spinoza and Maimonides fully agree that the Hebrew Bible/Torah and Judaism are essentially a "law" that God revealed to Moses on Mount Sinai. Yet the question is to know the nature of this Revelation as well as the purpose, scope and receivers of this law. Contrary to the "normative belief" of Rabbinic Judaism, elaborated and formulated explicitly by Maimonides, what God revealed to Moses is only the Law of "the State of the Hebrews according to Spinoza" –that is, a political and ceremonial law only aimed at the preservation of this once oppressed people, recently liberated from a long slavery. One could certainly find or draw from it some moral and universal principles, but the Law itself, as received, understood and applied by Moses and the Biblical Hebrews, could definitely not be considered as universal, moral, or eternal. However, Spinoza recognizes that the teachings of the New Testament or rather that of "Jesus Christ" is completely based on a universal and eternal truth. That being the case, he must explain, on the prophetologic or theological-political ground, the transition that takes place in within the Scripture, with the message of "Christ," which presents itself as a continuation and the fulfillment of the preceding laws and prophecies. It is therefore clear to us that the question of the divine law is closely related to that of the prophecy. For Maimonides, the uniqueness of Moses's prophecy is also reflected in the fact that it consists of a Law-Science, enclosing the eternal truths and the ways to reach both socio-political and individual perfection. The legal form of the Sinaitic revelation testifies to the ultimate perfection and the exceptional "divine emanation" that Moses received from God. This also explains the (partial) impenetrability of the divine wisdom of the Law/Torah of Moses. On the other hand, according to Spinoza, far from implying an unreachable understanding of God, the prophecy of Moses fits precisely into the ordinary perception of the prophets of the "Old Testament" which consists basically in a "lack of knowledge." In other words, what we call in our study the "prophetic juridification" of the divine revelation corresponds, from Adam to Moses, to a misunderstanding of this revelation as to its source, its causes, its functioning and its objectives. Moreover, this process of juridification is extended in the Pharisaic conception of God and of Scripture, since the Pharisees/rabbis remain firmly attached to the concept of a "lawgiver God." In their case, that leads to a legalism without the enforceability of the law after the destruction of the State. So, if conceiving the revelation as a divine law/command amounts to a misinterpretation of the very same revelation, the goal must be, according to Spinoza, and at least for "philosopher readers" or for those want to be "above the law," to return the process of this prophetic juridification and to attain, by using only the "natural light," to an adequate knowledge of the truth and the object of the divine law. Which means that, with regard to God and his actions, the word "law" can only be used in an inadequate and metaphorical manner. Moreover, insofar that one begins to "abide" by the divine or instituted law, not by virtue of obedience to a more or less wise and politically stabilizing force, but by an internal causal chain characterizing his/her very nature, one is in fact considered as being above the law, just as beyond morality. This is what we call in our work the "sublation of the law." Therefore we argue that, this theme that permeates the Spinozist critique of Pharisaism and Maimonideanism also reveals a strong proximity between him and Paul of Tarsus.