Kant ve Levinas'ta öz-bilincin insan öznelliğindeki rolü

If Kant is a philosopher commonly known to be "the inventor of subjectivity", Levinas is the one who reinvents it as concrete subjectivity starting from the Other. Even though two centuries separate the two thinkers, we can see that Kant and Levinas play the same role on the stage of the history of thought: that of a defender of subjectivity. However, we do not lose sight of the fact that the subject of which Kant speaks in the Critique de la raison pure is a gnoseological subject, while that of Levinas is defined rather as a responsible subject. Despite this fairly important point of divergence between these two philosophers, the common insistence on subjectivity allows us to establish a link between their philosophical projects. Two questions will serve as guidelines: 1. Can Levinas's understanding of subjectivity be inspired by that of Kant?; 2. Can a Levinassian reading of Kant offer a solution to the impasses of the knowing subject in Kant which originate in the nature of transcendental apperception? To answer these questions, we consider the theory of knowledge as a device insofar as it allows us to show that, without a new epistemology, a new relationship with things and the world, it is not possible to imagine a concrete subject responsible for oneself and for the Other. So to give a general outline of our thesis, we need to summarize it in detail. Our thesis is made up of three parts: the first is entitled "Criticism as a method in Levinas", the second "Levinas and the phenomenology of Husserl", the third and last "On the role of self-consciousness in subjectivity of the subject". The challenge of our first part is to shed light on the Levinassian method in his first "pre-war" writings, such as Quelques réflexions sur la philosophie de l'Hitlérisme, La compréhension de la spiritualité dans la culture française et allemande, "L'actualité de Maïmonide" and in particular De l'évasion. One carries out a parallel reading of these writings of Levinas with the "Preface" of the Critique de la raison pure (1781) of Kant. Thus, we try to show that the Levinassian method is based on the Kantian critical method. To prove our hypothesis, we claim that Kant's critical method has a triple perspective: denaturalization, non-exclusivity and the end as an unfinished system. After having underlined this methodological proximity of Levinas and Kant, we focus on the question of consciousness, always remaining within the framework of Levinas's early writings, especially in De l'évasion. In this second moment of Part One, we aim to establish that consciousness is always preceded by existence in Levinas. In order to demonstrate this thesis, we go through the Levinassian reading of Louis Lavalle's La Présence totale, according to which the presence of being is announced in the fact of consciousness. Levinas interprets it by the event of shame, for shame is par excellence the feeling of the brutality of the being which weighs on the shoulders of the ego. And by that, we see that Levinas develops one of his main notions "chaining to being". Consequently, it turns out that the subject finds itself chained in being and in its body, and that Levinas does not consider the subjectivity of the subject and consciousness without their relation or their chaining to being. In the second part of our thesis, we seek to shed light on the close relationship of Levinas's philosophy with Husserl's phenomenology as it is outlined in Théorie de l'intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl, and "L'œuvre de M. E. Husserl". Our main objective is to discover, on the one hand, how Levinas appropriates Husserl's philosophy, and on the other, to grasp the starting point of Levinas's critiques of the theory of knowledge. In doing so, we also find the opportunity to shed light on Levinas's philosophical method, which can be described as follows: Levinas always has a tendency to push any philosophy from which he is most inspired, "beyond" (au-delà) the limits of its literal meaning, in order to grasp its inner core. In the Levinassian reading of Husserl, we focus on the interpretation of Husserl's notion of intentionality. We realize that Levinas is critiquing the empire of theory over complex acts, and that he is looking for a way to break this privilege conferred on theory. This analysis, in turn, will provide an argument that is central to this thesis: consciousness does not turn towards the world by an objectifying act, by a visée de…, but by intentional feelings. This study leads to three observations. First, Levinas criticizes the exaltation of theory and intellectualism for despising feelings and affections. Second, we notice that from the start of his philosophical journey, even in his readings of Husserl, Levinas' problematic does not change, since he continues to pursue the possibility of philosophizing "beyond". We can see that this research by Levinas is nourished by two sources: critical and phenomenological philosophy. Thirdly, we try to underline the Levinassian reflection on subjectivity and its motivation to think about a subject in its relation to the world, as well as its ambition to find another path that leads towards a phenomenology of concreteness in which it is the life lived and not the theoretical life which is primordial. In the third and last part of our thesis, the role of which is fundamental for this work, our objective is to bring out the features of the theory of knowledge and of the knowing subject in Levinas. To do this, we study the "post-war" writings of Levinas, and we take a closer look at the fundamental notions of this period of Levinas's writing, such as the event of jouissance, of the il y a, of desire, of the laziness, fatigue, insomnia, light, and hypostasis. From these analyses, we show that enjoyment is the condition of the possibility of the separation of the ego from being, and thus also of knowledge. Without a felt desire for the world, the ego would never have been able to separate itself from the anonymity of the il y a, and therefore to set in motion a hypostasis. However, Levinas does not think of the subject starting from an élan vital, on the contrary he tries to reconstruct the subject starting from an event of laziness and fatigue as the main attitude of the ego in regards to being. The particular being (l'étant) withdraws and comes back on itself so as not to submit to the empire of being itself (l'être). It is therefore a question of hesitation to take responsibility before one's existence. We can see that Levinas declares a break with the Western philosophical tradition by placing at the heart of the subject a withdrawal from being and thus a certain passivity. To approach the understanding of the theory of knowledge and of the knowing subject in Levinas, we propose to analyze the concept of light. From this point of view, the consciousness which withdraws towards itself, takes, in fact, a certain distance in relation to things and to the world. This distance, this quant à soi is created by means of what Levinas calls "light". This concept signifies the principle of knowledge, that is, the power to make the other one's own, without allowing oneself to be affected by him. By analyzing this aspect, we understand that freedom is only possible in this place of distance, in that quant à soi. However, as soon as it appears, it manifests itself as responsibility – a specific responsibility towards one's body. Finally, we bring to light that in Levinas the knowing subject is defined on the basis of responsibility and not on the basis of freedom. To finish this last part, we examine whether Kant's transcendental subject comes close to that of Levinas. In order to answer this question, we go through the meaning of the transcendental in Kant and in Levinas. We deduce from this that Levinas leads the Kantian transcendental movement "beyond" its limits. It consolidates the transcendental subject from ethical responsibility while remaining outside ontology. We thus open a new path for the theory of knowledge by showing that the justification of knowledge in fact conceals a problem of justice in relation to the object. This movement of justification is a permanent responsibility of the knowing subject. At the end of this inquiry it turns out that, unlike Kant, Levinas posits the Other as a condition of the subject's possibility, a condition which also leads him to place ethical responsibility as the foundation of that of epistemology. Levinas has affirmed from the beginning of his philosophical journey that the critique of practical reason must precede that of speculative reason. By following this deeply Kantian idea, he gives primacy to ethics and poses it as a condition of epistemology. However, the big difference between the two thinkers lies in the fact that Levinas overturns the autonomy of the subject through the idea of the Other. But it is precisely due to this upheaval that he can make this singular contribution to Kant's transcendental philosophy: the Other is an exception in the system of being, he comes from "outside-being" (hors-être), and only an encounter with the Other leads the subject to this "outside-being" or to the ethical order. Thus, ruining the principle of the unconditioned condition on which the transcendental subject rests, Levinas can reinforce the transcendent subject as an "outside-being". He succeeds in saving a certain privilege of the subject, by replacing his epistemological privilege by the ethical subject.