The critical role of the imagination within the limits of the critique of pure reason

This study focuses on the position and function of the faculty of imagination in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason published in 1781. The role Kant assigns to the faculty of imagination differs in the A and B editions of the Critique of Pure Reason. For the purpose of this thesis, edition A is preferred. In edition A, Kant mentions three faculties as transcendental faculties: sensibility, understanding and imagination. The imagination assumes an important function in the establishment of knowledge. The synthesis between sensibility and understanding is only possible through the imagination. The role of synthesis that Kant attributes to the imagination is analysed within the scope of the deduction and schematism sections of the Critique of Pure Reason. The first part of the thesis aims to conduct a brief origin investigation on the adventure of the pre-Kantian imagination. The second part covers Kant's pre-critical works that form the basis of his transcendental philosophy. Finally, the third part of the thesis analyses the transcendental role of the faculty of imagination within the limits of the first of Kant's critiques, the Critique of Pure Reason. The aim of the study is to analyse and show the role and function assigned to the faculty of imagination in Kant's epistemology. In addition, since Kant's faculty of imagination is analysed by considering the views of philosophers who preceded him, it is also within the scope of the study to present the views of some philosophers in the period from Ancient Greece to Kant. According to the conclusion reached in line with the aim of the study, it is seen that the faculty of imagination has an important function in Kant's transcendental philosophy, but it is concluded that a dark spot remains in this thought about the faculty of imagination.