Denial and affirmation of life in Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's nihilisms

In this thesis, the opposition between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche takes the form of the opposition between passive nihilism and active nihilism, with Leopardi included as a side element in the discussion. Some general issues handled by these philosophers were handled in the context of the meaning and/or meaningfulness of life; It has been tried to reach a decision about which attitude is more consistent, more appropriate or more reasonable. It has been seen that both philosophers have some important inconsistencies. However, what emerges here is that the way both philosophers understand and/or make sense of life is largely under the determination of their metaphysical assumptions and attitudes towards selfishness. The self is naturally selfish, and affirming our natural will means affirming selfishness. Indeed, selfishness, affirmation of will, and affirmation of life are in correlation. However, the final decision as to whether the affirmation or denial of life is reasonable/appropriate will be taken depending on whether life is valuable and meaningful, and whether life is futile. In this thesis, the arguments presented by the philosophers in order to decide on this are presented and it is evaluated which decision is more consistent.