Overcoming substance dualism in the context of Searle's theory of consciousness

The mind-body distinction has remained one of the most enduring and controversial problems in the history of philosophy. Traces of dualistic approaches can be found as early as Plato, continuing prominently with Descartes. Descartes defined the mind and the body as two completely distinct substances, a view later termed "substance dualism." However, especially throughout the 20th century, this position faced extensive criticism. One of the most comprehensive and systematic critiques of substance dualism was developed by John Searle. Searle argues that the mind is a biologically based phenomenon; it is not an independent substance apart from the body, but neither is it reducible to purely physical processes. According to him, the mind emerges from the functions of the brain and is situated within the biological and physical world. This position forms the basis of what he calls "biological naturalism." For Searle, consciousness is the central feature of the mind—irreducible yet functionally explainable. This study examines Searle's theory of consciousness in the context of his critique of substance dualism and aims to show how his approach seeks to overcome the classical dualistic framework. Furthermore, the study analyzes Searle's relation to materialist perspectives and evaluates the naturalistic foundations of his philosophy. In doing so, it aims to reveal the originality and philosophical significance of Searle's proposed solution to the mind-body problem.