The translation Sarbastzâda's Şerh-i Celâl tercumesi and its analysis in the context of cosmological argument

In this thesis, the work of Sarbastzâda Ahmet Hamdi (1864-1939) named İlm-i Kelâm'dan "Akâid-i Adûdiyye" Şerhi Celâl Tercümesi has been studied. The views on the 'cosmological argument' in this translation have been analyzed in comparison with some examples of this argument in the classical and modern periods. From the classical versions of the cosmological argument, possibility and huduth, and from the modern period, the philosophical version of the kalam cosmological argument have been used. It has been observed that there is a parallelism between the criticisms of the cosmological argument in the Şerh-i Celâl Tercümesi, which was written in the classical period, and the criticisms made in the modern period, and the answers given to these criticisms are revealed in the work. After the analysis of the relevant parts, the following opinions were determined: In the work, the claims of the philosophers about the huduth argument from classical proofs that God created the world not by will or intention, but by necessity, and that the world is ancient in time are not accepted. Again, it has been concluded that God, who is autonomous in the subject of possibility, created the world not with "necessity" but with "invention". Finally, it has been seen that in the philosophical version of the theological kalam cosmological argument put forward in the modern period, and the period that we see as the reflection of this version in the Şerh-i Celal, the same conclusion has been reached about the impossibility of tasalsul, that is, the universe cannot go on forever in a cause-effect relationship. After all, at the end of this chain, there is a Creator who decides and creates with his own will and choice, and whose existence does not depend on anyone else.