The place of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey within the Turkish state organization and the comparison of it with the European Central Bank

The reason why the concept of central bank independence has arisen is explained, in the simplest words, with the necessity to separate the governments who are in need of unlimited sources due to their functions, from the central banks who issue money and implement monetary policy. Otherwise it becomes impossible to fight against inflation and to maintain price stability. It is a known fact that this situation generates heavy economic, moral and social consequences.Accordingly, the conclusion that a central bank must be independent is drawn again by economists at the end of an empirical economic process.However, the subsequent problem following this conclusion is, in more clear words, that the questions such as what the central bank independence is, how it might be achieved, the limits of it are, much more than being economic, of legal nature.Within this framework, in this thesis two basic questions are dealt with. The first of these questions is where and how the Central Bank is positioned within our State organization. The second is how much this position of the Bank overlaps with the legal pattern determined by the European Union for central banks.Therefore, in the first chapter, with a view to establish a ground for the matters to be mentioned in the next chapters, the general legal framework pertaining to the Bank and the history of the Bank which sheds light on today, are examined.The second chapter is allocated to the answer sought for the first of the basic questions above cited. Hence the issues such as the legal nature of the Bank, whether It takes place within the central administration or not, whether It is a functionally decentralized organisation or not, whether It might be categorized as an independent administrative authority or not, the position of the Bank in terms of the integrity of the administration are deliberated.In the third chapter, what the concept of central bank independence means, the minimum conditions of it, its limits and its classification are dealt with. Furthermore and chiefly, the question whether the concept is compatible with democratic principles, is dwelled upon.Moreover, in this chapter it is discussed how the economic choice, which stipulates that the central bank managers who do not come in through elections and who have no political responsibility implement the monetary policy independently from the government under their own responsibility, might be explained within a legal structure that may be briefed as ?democratic state?.The last of the issues, which fall within the scope of the third chapter, is the idea of securing the independence of the central bank in the constitution and whether this idea is under the monopoly of the discipline of constitutional economics.The fourth chapter covers the evaluation of the statute attributed to the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey within the framework of the practical criteria used by the European Central Bank, which are briefed as institutional, functional, personal and financial independence.This evaluation has entailed mentioning the legal statute of the European Central Bank as well.Key Words1. Central Bank2. Central Bank Independence3. European Central Bank4. Statute of the Central Bank5. Constitutionality of the Central Bank