Türkiye'de siyasi kredi döngüleri ve ekonomik oy verme

This thesis contributes to the study of economic voting, financialization, political credit cycles, debt-financed consumption behavior and political polarization in Turkey. First, First, it introduces the concept of selective accountability to highlight a key distinction between the political fortunes of President Erdoğan and the ruling AKP, showing how voters differentiate between his leadership and the party's performance. Selective accountability, driven by polarization and political interests, helps explain why Erdoğan maintains his position despite AKP's vote losses. Second, the thesis asserts that voters' economic decisions in Turkey are significantly impacted by pre-election credit expansions, referred to as political credit cycles. It posits that reduced interest rates and credit expansion provide immediate financial relief to indebted or hand-to-mouth households, thereby mitigating the adverse effects of inflation on voter behavior. The empirical analysis examines the relationship between personal credit card (PCC) debt and voting behavior during the 2018 and 2023 concurrent presidential and parliamentary elections. By analyzing city-level data, it suggests that voters' propensity to reward or punish government is influenced by changes in interest rate expenditures and credit availability. The findings indicate that support for the AKP was more resilient in provinces with higher levels of PCC debt, suggesting that voters rewarded the party for reducing their financial burdens through lower interest rates and expanded credit availability. Furthermore, the thesis contributes to the discussions on how credit market interventions can serve as private alternatives to public welfare in weak welfare states.