Unilateral sanctions in international relations: An analysis on the European Union's restrictive measures

Since the 1950s, despite the occasional resort to armed force by states, use of non-military force has become prevalent in international affairs. Often, such use of force was done collectively, via United Nations ("UN") sanctions—economic, diplomatic, or otherwise—under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, in the past few years, "sanctions" took a different turn. This thesis examines the European Union's ("EU") overreliance on restrictive measures as a central tool of its foreign policy, exploring the paradox of an organization grounded in liberal principles but increasingly employing realist strategies. As the EU has become more dependent on restrictive measures to safeguard its strategic interests—particularly in the absence of cohesive military power—significant questions arise about its position in the international arena, its commitment to international law, and the relationship between EU law and international legal norms. The analysis focuses on the legal and political dimensions of EU restrictive measures, conducting case studies of Turkey, Russia, and Zimbabwe to explore the motivations, justifications, and implications of such measures. It adopts a two-staged analysis. The first stage examines whether these restrictive measures comply with international law, assessing the correct terminology and legal classification. The second stage explores the interests and strategic considerations driving the EU's decisions to impose such measures. Overall, this interdisciplinary study concludes that EU restrictive measures function as a hybrid instrument, combining strategic self-interest with liberal rhetoric, reflecting the EU's evolving role as both a sui generis organization and a geopolitical force.