Discussing higher-order theories of consciousness: Between HOT theory and self-representationalism

This study examines whether higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness should be adapted into a form of self-representationalism. I utilize the problem of misrepresentation as a tool to investigate the fundamental nature of HOT theory. The analysis reveals that HOT theory oscillates between the transitivity principle and the division of phenomenal labor. As the content of higher-order thought overdetermines conscious experience, the theory permits the occurrence of conscious experience in the absence of corresponding first-order mental states in cases of radical misrepresentation. Conversely, HOT theory is based on a relational structure involving first-order and higher-order mental states, wherein a first-order state becomes conscious if appropriately represented by a HOT. While the theory's allowance for misrepresentation is considered an advantage, the tension between two principles leads to additional problems. Most of the proposed modifications are independently motivated by attempts to account for an intrinsic notion of consciousness but it is not necessary to transform HOT theory into self-representationalism. Nevertheless, the relational structure of HOT theory remains, prompting ongoing efforts to develop alternative forms that preserve the existence of first-order states while maintaining the core principles of the HOT framework. Should the relational structure not be preserved, the theory risks collapsing into a variant of first-order thought theory. Exploring this possibility, I argue that integrating an account of a thick notion of self may better complement HOT theory compared to attempts that align it more closely with self-representational approaches.