Smart adaptive and against to the enemy that organized attack terror purpose, optimal use of available resources at the aspect of game theory analysis

Terrorism has recently reached the international extents, terrorist organizations have started to target more countries to achieve their political aims in global scale. Threatened countries are obliged to defend the targets within their territory for their economic interests and societal psychology. In this study, we examined the problem of defending these targets within the framework of economic measures. Defending these targets is so costly that for decreasing the cost of defending and the risk, analytical approach is required. Game-Theory is one the most effective approach used for the enemies adapting in accordance to their targets. Government?s aim is prevent terrorist attacks within their territory or minimizing the loss in the terrorist attack. In this government-terrorist game, we assume that attacker and the defender do not move simultaneously. The State primarily allocates security resources to targets that to be protected. On the other side, the terrorist observes the state and carries out terrorist attacks.In this study a model with two players, two potential targets in the government?s territory and analyzing the possibility of attack on this targets was established. Bayesian approach was used on the gain of the attacker and loss function of defender was defined. By using this model, it is aimed to investigate the worth of intelligence and its effect on decisions to be made.