Bertrand-cournot mixed duopoly with private and public information

In this thesis, we characterize the private and social value of demand information in a Bertrand-Cournot mixed duopoly setup in which a price-setting firm competes with a quantity-setting firm. We show that the expected equilibrium profit of each firm increases with the precision of its own private signal. Moreover, the expected consumer and total surpluses decrease (increase) after the private signal of the price-setting (quantity-setting) firm becomes more precise. The expected total surplus increases (decreases) in the precision of the public signal about demand if the price-setting firm is weakly better (sufficiently lower) informed than the quantity-setting firm. Lastly, we show that when the choice of strategic variable (prices vs. quantities) is endogenous for firms, Bertrand-Cournot mixed duopoly occurs for a wide range of parameter values.