A study on the realism anti-realism debate in science

One of the most important debates in the philosophy of science is the problem of how to understand entities such as electrons, molecules, genes, etc. assumed by scientific theories, which is called the problem of the unobservables. On one side of the debate about the justification of the belief in the existence of the unobservables is scientific realism and on the other side is anti-realism. Scientific realism argues that the truth of scientific theories can lead to justified belief in the existence of unobservables. Scientific realists argue that the no-miracle argument, which explains the success of scientific theories, guarantees a justified belief in the existence of the unobservable. Anti-realists argue that it is not possible to defend the claim that the truth of scientific theories guarantees belief in the existence of the unobservable if one appeals to arguments such as incommensurability, pessimistic induction, and underdetermination through the history of science. The aim of this paper is to show the consequences of justifying the belief in the existence of unobservables through the truth of scientific theories to the detriment of scientific realism. The claim of the study is that scientific realism can be defended against anti-realism without relying on the truth of scientific theories. In other words, it will be argued that the belief in the existence of unobservables can be justified through a criterion independent of the truth of scientific theories.