The war of Malazgirt and The Byzantine Army from the perspective of Byzantine sources and works of western researchers

The Byzantine Empire reached its highest status in economics, political and military matters at the beginning of the 11th century. The unsuccessful rule of the emperors who took the throne after the death of Basileios II (976-1025) in 1025 caused the empire to enter a period of decline. The decline continued for many years. During this period, the thema system that formed the body of the imperial army was disrupted. In such an environment, after the death of X. Konstantinos Dukas (1059-1067) in 1067, Romanos Diogenes ascended the imperial throne on January 1, 1068. When Romanos Diogenes ascended the throne, he first worked on military issues. In this regard, he renewed the military equipment and paid wages to the soldiers. However, he did not make any reforms to improve the army. The reason for this situation is that the priority of Romanos Diogenes was to break the power of the group that wanted to deththrone him. The way to do this was to prevent Turkish raids in Anatolia. For this purpose, he went on a campaign with his army against the Turks who were active in Anatolia in 1068-1069. When the campaign did not bring the desired success, he deployed military force under the command of Manuel Komnenos in 1070 to fight the Turks. Romanos Diogenes, who could not get a definite result from these campaigns, marched against the Turks with a larger army in 1071. This army, prepared by mobilizing all sources of the empire, suffered an unexpected defeat against the Seljuk army commanded by Sultan Alparslan in the Malazgirt Plain. Byzantine sources regarded the betrayal of the emperor, the wrong intelligence he received, and his arrogance as the reasons for this Failure. Western researchers, on the other hand, see the tactical mistakes of Diogenes and the betrayals he suffered as the reasons for the defeat of the Byzantine army.