Rethinking deterrence theory: Asymmetrical deterrence and game theory

During the Cold War-era, deterrence theory was a central focus in international security studies with regard to the use of nuclear weapons. The effort of scholars to analyse nuclear competition between the United States and Soviet Union produced seminal works on deterrence. In the early period of deterrence research, scholars have focused on analyzing of the situation where superpowers engage in a rivalry with the use of game theory. In the 1970s, some scholars began to use case-study methods questioning the rational actor assumption to test deterrence theory. The case-study literature of deterrence have focused on the conventional level of conflict unlike the earlier research of nuclear deterrence. In the post-Cold War era, deterrence research address the issue of deterring non-state actors and rogue states. Post-Cold War era reveals that a military capability is not a sufficient element for deterrence success in itself and deterrence stability also rests upon the preferences and perceptions of decision makers. Deterrence theory therefore needs to take into account unique features of opponents' identity and strategic culture. The study accordingly reviews deterrence theory with the purpose of evaluating the current status of the concept of deterrence in international relations.