Value of intelligence in homeland security problems with multiple targets

This paper presents an analytical approach that is intended to determine the value of intelligence in a homeland security problem with multiple targets under different scenarios. We analyze the strategies available to the decision maker and evaluate two separate intelligence resources on the basis of improvements in security resource allocation. Various scenarios that the decision maker might encounter as a result of the intelligence gathering activity were modeled using nonlinear programming. The defender should defend two targets against two independent terrorist organizations and thus decide on the security level that must be maintained to prevent a terrorist attack. The defender will bear the costs of security and receiving additional intelligence as well as the losses of a successful attack. The defender can make a decision with or without receiving additional intelligence. We consider both perfect and imperfect intelligence on terrorist attack preferences. An extensive numerical study is also provided to illustrate the defender behavior under realistic parameter value scenarios. Sensitivity of intelligence gathering and security resource allocation decisions are analyzed as part of our numerical study.