The place of constitutional judiciary in democracies and the formation of constitutional courts

In this thesis, the aim is to examine the place and function of constitutional review in democracies, as well as the institutional designs of constitutional courts. The main research question of the study is how the structure of constitutional review institutions relates to the quality or level of democracy. In line with the defined objectives, the thesis has been structured into two chapters. In the first chapter, the concept of democracy and theories of democracy are analyzed, followed by an examination of constitutional thought and movements, the principle of the rule of law, and constitutional review from various perspectives. The relationship between constitutional review, the rule of law, and democracy is evaluated, with a particular focus on the issue of legitimacy. The study proceeds from the assumption that constitutional review is a necessity for democratic political regimes. In the second chapter, a comparative analysis is conducted to reveal how the institutional structures of constitutional review relate to the levels of democracy in different countries. For this purpose, countries were classified according to their democracy levels based on Freedom House data, and a distinction was drawn between full and electoral democracies. The research then sought to answer the question: "Are there significant differences between the structures of constitutional review institutions in full and electoral democracies?" Within this framework, the constitutional review institutions of full democracies (Germany, France, the United States, and Austria) and electoral democracies (Hungary, Georgia, India, and Albania) were comparatively examined. The analysis was carried out through document review of the constitutions and relevant laws of the selected countries, focusing on criteria such as the number of members, appointment methods, term length, reappointment rules, and qualifications required for membership. The findings indicate that the institutional structures of constitutional review do not systematically differ according to the identified democracy levels.