Epistemic paradoxes: A finite cognition approach

This dissertation approaches epistemic paradoxes not as signs of the epistemic subject's irrational weaknesses but as reflections of the structural tensions of rational life. The central problematic is that an epistemic subject can, on reasonable grounds, hold both p and ¬p simultaneously, without being able to discard either belief without violating epistemic responsibility. The study undertakes a three-stage analysis to address this issue. In the first chapter, a philosophical classification of epistemic paradoxes is provided. Self-referential statements, cases arising from the application of the principle of aggregation to high-probability beliefs, situations forcing the epistemic subject into necessarily irrational outcomes, and tensions between the subject's cognitive intuitions and rational inferences are discussed with illustrative examples. Thus, paradoxes are mapped not only descriptively but also conceptually in a systematic manner. The second chapter presents and critically evaluates the main approaches in the literature on epistemic paradoxes. This includes logical analyses, probability-theoretic perspectives, interpretations within the framework of normative reasons theory, and fallibilist approaches. The discussion shows that existing accounts tend either to dismiss paradoxes as spurious or to neglect the epistemic subject's rational responsibilities. The third chapter develops the original contribution of the dissertation. Epistemic paradoxes are classified into three categories: (i) Spurious epistemic paradoxes, (ii) paradoxes stemming from current limitations of knowledge, and (iii) genuine epistemic paradoxes. This classification highlights the different dimensions of paradoxes and reveals their normative significance. The chapter then advances an approach which we call "the finite cognition approach" as a response to the third category. According to this approach, the epistemic subject applies the principle of non-contradiction only within local contexts in relation to epistemic paradoxes. The fact that the beliefs reached through rational justification in different contexts may contradict one another on a universal level does not appear to be a responsibility that the subject can realistically fulfill. Since the subject cannot encompass the universal context and does not possess a divine level of cognition, they likewise lack the capacity to resolve such contradictions. In conclusion, the dissertation argues that epistemic paradoxes are not problems to be eliminated but natural components of epistemic life, arising from the subject's finite cognition and the multilayered nature of reality. Accordingly, paradoxes are seen as playing a functional and legitimate role in epistemic practice, sustaining rational inquiry and keeping philosophical reflection alive. The dissertation thus repositions epistemic paradoxes not as irrational anomalies to be solved, but as structural tensions intrinsic to rational life.