Conflicting evidence in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's methods of usûl

Unlike other legal systems, Islamic Law, as its name suggests, is a legal system derived from divine sources. The rulings established in Islamic Law are not, in essence, the product of jurists' own reasoning. On the contrary, jurists (mujtahids) eveal the corresponding rulings for novel issues by drawing upon the rulings established by God Almighty in the Qur'an and by the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) in the Sunnah. In doing so, the jurists (fuqaha) followed a systematic methodology, avoiding arbitrary decisions. The systems they developed were influenced by their scholarly erudition as well as the intellectual traditions of the educational institutions in which they were trained. Consequently, a piece of evidence accepted by one jurist might be rejected by another. Thus, within Islamic Law, while consensus was reached on certain fundamental proofs used by the jurists, others became subjects of disagreement. These proofs were later discussed by legal theorists (usulis) under independent headings in their works. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī is one of these prominent legal theorists. Within this scope, the contentious proofs in al-Rāzī's legal theory have been determined as the subject of this thesis. Utilizing the documentary analysis technique, a qualitative research method, this study aims to examine al- Rāzī's views on ten contentious proofs. This thesis consists of two main parts. The first part will address the unanimously accepted proofs and, so as not to exceed the scope of the thesis, seven well-known disputed proofs. The second part, which forms the core of the thesis, will examine the contentious proofs discussed by al- Rāzī, the objections raised against his positions on these proofs, and the responses he provided. Al-Rāzī accepts certain proofs such as the principle of the original ruling and the presumption of continuity (istishâb al-hâl), while he rejects others like the statements of the Companions and juristic preference (istihsân). Regarding delegated rulings (tafwidi rulings), he maintains that one should suspend judgment. He engages in intricate debates concerning these proofs.