Hume on the value of insatiable curiosity

Epistemic subjects become curious about what they do not know. However, what they become curious about is sometimes not only unknown but also unknowable to them due to their limited mental faculties and cognitive abilities. In this thesis, two kinds of curiosity are distinguished. Satiable curiosity is about a knowable object, and it is epistemically possible to satisfy it by the knowledge of that object. On the other hand, insatiable curiosity is about an unknowable object, and therefore, it is epistemically impossible to satisfy it. This thesis, which is partly theoretical and partly historical, raises the question of whether insatiable curiosity is valuable and aims to show that we can extract an affirmative answer to this question from David Hume's account of curiosity. In this thesis, I offer a novel interpretation of the section titled "Of curiosity, or the love of truth" in Book II of A Treatise of Human Nature. I argue that Hume's explication of the relationship between curiosity and pleasure reflects his view on the value of curiosity. It is generally held that Hume arrives at skeptical conclusions with respect to many different issues, one of which is causation. In this thesis, I take Hume's curiosity about causation as an example of insatiable curiosity and suggest reading the section devoted to curiosity in light of his own insatiable curiosity. By appealing to the novel interpretation offered in this thesis, I conclude that, for Hume, insatiable curiosity is instrumentally valuable in virtue of having the capacity to give pleasure to an epistemic subject.