England's positioning in Cyprus in its Middle East military strategy (1945-1955)

In this study examines England's strategy of holding on to the Middle East between 1945 and 1955, the difficulties it encountered there, why it had to move the Headquarters of the Middle East General Command in Egypt to Cyprus and what goals it aimed to achieve with the move. The research is important as it covers a period in which the world military-political balances were re-established after the Second World War. As a matter of fact, England's attempt to become permanent in Cyprus after Egypt was evaluated as a reflex to maintain its presence in military-political mechanisms in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. In order to reveal the issue, the problems that the British government had with Egypt, the location of the island of Cyprus, the reactions of the Greeks and Greece against England, and the military force with which England settled on the island were included. Attention was also drawn to the perspectives of Turkey and Greece on the Cyprus issue, the activities of Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus against England, and the stance of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser opposing England. The main sources for this research were the minutes of the British Cabinet and the British Parliament. In addition, the research was supported by British newspapers of the period.