İnsan harici hayvanlardan insan olan hayvanlara ahlakın yükselişi: Duygu temelli bir yaklaşım

The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether morality is uniquely human, and to argue that emotions are the basis of morality in the sense that moral behavior is produced by emotions. In order to support my suggestion, I first intend to investigate the nature and function of emotions. Furthermore, I adopt an evolutionary perspective suggesting that our biology pushed us toward caring about certain things surrounding us. In accordance with this assertion, I endeavor to examine whether moral judgments and moral beliefs can be illustrated in a non-cognitivist way from the perspectives of both naturalist philosophers and evolutionary scientists. Accordingly, I defend the view that moral judgment is a non-propositional, psychological attitude. From a contemporary perspective, we might argue that Hume's interpretation of moral judgment adopts a non-cognitivist and non-propositional attitude. Moreover, moral judgment does not express a proposition that describes facts and is truth evaluable; rather, it expresses feelings. In this sense, moral judgment is a psychological inclination to feeling a specific emotion and, accordingly, the particular emotion comprises approval or disapproval in terms of moral judgment. Finally, since moral judgment is considered to be the most significant element of being a moral agent and if I can explain moral judgment in precisely the way I describe above, then it will open the room for morality among animals. In other words, my position that moral judgment is non-propositional supports the idea that we may attribute morality to non-human animals.